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DONAHUE’S FILS AÎN É: REFLECTIONS ON 




DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Judging from frequency of citations, Wilkes v. Springside Nurs­
ing Home, Inc.1 is at best the “oldest son” of the “great man” that is 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.2  A recent Westlaw search shows 
that the latter has been cited more than twice as many times as the 
former,3 and Donahue’s pronouncement “that stockholders in the 
close corporation owe one another . . . the utmost good faith and 
loyalty”4 seems the modern analog to Cardozo’s “punctilio of an 
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; A.B., Harvard University; 
J.D., Yale Law School. 
1. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
2. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). The phrase 
“fils aı̂né” means literally “oldest son” but in earlier times also connoted the offspring 
expected to carry on the traditions of the family.  E-mail from F. R. P. (Ron) Akehurst, 
Emeritus Professor of French, University of Minnesota, to Daniel Kleinberger, Profes­
sor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law (Oct. 1, 2010, 3:31 PM CST) (on file with 
the author).  According to Professor Akehurst: 
In the customary law areas (northern France) and until the fourteenth century 
the southern half of the country, the eldest son had preferential treatment.  In 
many places he got two thirds of his father’s (real) estate, while the other 
siblings shared the rest between them.  He also got the title, if there was one, 
and the principal fortified place or castle, itf [sic] there was one or more. 
Id.; see also PHILIPPE DE REMI BEAUMANOIR, THE Coutumes de Beauvaisis of Philippe 
de Beaumanoir 465 (F. R. P. Akehurst trans., 1992). 
3. As of February 4, 2011, Donahue had been cited 1,554 times. KEYCITE CITING 
REFERENCES: Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., Westlaw, www.westlaw.com (search 
for Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 and following the “Citing Refer­
ences” link) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).  However, as of February 4, 2011, Wilkes had 
only been cited 779 times. KEYCITE CITING REFERENCES: Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home, Inc., Westlaw, www.westlaw.com (search for Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 and following the “Citing References” link) (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2011). 
4. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (footnote omitted) (quoting DeCotis v. D’Antona, 
214 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Mass. 1966); Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
405 
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honor the most sensitive.”5 
Wilkes, in contrast, does not appear seminal.  Courts outside 
Massachusetts cite it only occasionally, and often in support of the 
Donahue rule of “utmost good faith.”6  Casebooks treat Donahue 
more often than Wilkes,7 and one of the articles in this symposium 
is entitled The Vacuity of Wilkes.8 
This Article, in contrast, asserts that Wilkes should be at least 
as memorable as Donahue, and is, in a practical sense, substantially 
more important.  The assertion rests on two propositions: first, that 
Donahue, like Meinhard v. Salmon,9 announces admirable senti­
ments but provides little practical guidance; second, that Wilkes 
provides the best practical rule for adjudicating “oppression”10 
5. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).  Indeed, Donahue sees its 
approach as an extrapolation of Cardozo’s ruling. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 516. 
6. E.g., Moore v. Maine Indus. Servs., Inc., 645 A.2d 626, 628 (Me. 1994); 
Tomaino v. Concord Oil of Newport, Inc., 709 A.2d 1016, 1021 (R.I. 1998); Solomon v. 
Atlantis Dev., Inc., 516 A.2d 132, 136 (Vt. 1986). 
7. E.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER H. KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND 
CASES ON THE  LAW OF  BUSINESS  ORGANIZATIONS 338-43 (1st ed. 2003) (excerpting 
Donahue; never citing or discussing Wilkes); ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., ENTERPRISE 
ORGANIZATION 803-13 (3rd ed. 1981) (excerpting Donahue; never discussing Wilkes, 
citing Wilkes only as a “Reference[ ] on Oppression in Close Corporations,” a list found 
after excerpted cases in the section); J.S. COVINGTON, JR., BASIC  LAW OF  CORPORA­
TIONS 369-78 (1989) (excerpting Donahue; never citing or discussing Wilkes); DAVID G. 
EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES 586-97 (2002) (excerpting Donahue; never dis­
cussing Wilkes, only citing Wilkes for an unrelated proposition in a different chapter); 
STEPHEN B. PRESSER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF BUSINESS  ORGANIZATIONS 
298-310 (2005) (excerpting Donahue; never discussing Wilkes, only citing Wilkes in ref­
erence to a single question posed in a “Notes & Questions” section); LARRY E. RIB­
STEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 276-85 (2d ed. 1990) (excerpting Donahue; never citing 
or discussing Wilkes); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUSINESS  ASSOCIA­
TIONS 203-11 (4th ed. 2003) (excerpting Donahue; very briefly mentioning Wilkes in the 
“Notes & Questions” section); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCOR­
PORATED  BUSINESS  ENTITIES 313 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing Donahue; never citing or 
discussing Wilkes).  When Wilkes does appear as a principal case, it is almost always a 
tag along with Donahue. E.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: 
LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 311-22 (2009) (excerpting both Don­
ahue and Wilkes; but beginning with Donahue, including a much shorter excerpt of 
Wilkes, and extensively discussing Donahue, nearly to the exclusion of Wilkes, in the 
“Notes” section following the cases); THOMAS  LEE  HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, 
CORPORATIONS AND  OTHER  BUSINESS  ENTERPRISES 305-16 (2d ed. 2006) (excerpting 
Donahue; only briefly discussing Wilkes in the “Notes” section following the excerpt of 
Donahue). 
8. Benjamin Means, The Vacuity of Wilkes, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 433 (2011). 
9. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546-47. 
10. This Article uses “oppression” to represent all the various labels jurisdictions 
use to denominate shareholder versus shareholder claims within close corporations, in­
cluding “unfairly prejudicial,” “loyalty,” and “reasonable expectations.” See, e.g., Mc-
Cauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 236 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (referring 
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claims when the alleged victim is also a miscreant or for some other 
reason the dispute is grey rather than black and white.11  In particu­
lar, this Article asserts that Wilkes’s multistep, burden-shifting rule 
is a nuanced and effective method for accommodating both a vic­
tim’s claim of majoritarian wrongdoing and the majority’s claim of 
legitimate motive and even business necessity. 
Because this symposium is for Wilkes rather than Donahue, 
description and praise of Wilkes occupies most of this Article. We 
begin, however, by putting Donahue in its place.  Part I describes 
the role of Donahue—then (i.e. when decided) and now.  Part II 
describes the “schizoid fiduciary duties”12 among owners within 
closely held businesses, states the Wilkes test, and explains that 
test’s genius for dealing with complex disputes among co-owners. 
Part III further delineates and explains the Wilkes test.  Part IV 
notes that, structurally and conceptually, Wilkes succeeded in put­
ting new wine in old bottles, giving the Wilkes rule a familiar feel 
despite its novel approach.  Part V uses two cases in which “op­
pressed” shareholders were also miscreants and shows how applica­
tion of the Wilkes rule would have produced a more nuanced 
analysis and a better result.  This Article concludes with some 
thoughts on the influence of Wilkes in Massachusetts and 
elsewhere. 
I. DONAHUE, THEN AND NOW 
Donahue was indubitably important when decided.  In 1975, it 
was far from a foregone conclusion that close corporations should 
be analogized to partnerships for the purposes of recognizing 
owner-to-owner fiduciary duties.13  Today, however, except in aber­
to “[o]ppressive conduct” as “an expansive term that is used to cover a multitude of 
situations dealing with improper conduct”); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 
1018 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (discussing the “[t]wo definitions [of oppression which] have 
gained currency in New York and in the numerous reported decisions across the 
country”). 
11. See infra Part V. 
12. See infra notes 28 and 39 and accompanying text. 
13. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 
BUS. LAW. 699, 704 (1993) (stating that “[i]n recent years, legislatures and courts have 
recognized the different characteristics of the close corporation and have modified the 
statutory and fiduciary norm” (emphasis added)); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppres­
sion & the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or Not) From Close Corporation His­
tory, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 894 (2005) (referring to “the seminal decision of 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.”).  It can argued that the label “seminal” more prop­
erly belongs to a different case, Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y. 1975), a case 
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rant jurisdictions such as Delaware14 and Louisiana,15 the notion of 
an “incorporated partnership”16 is a given, and the cases applying 
shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary duties are easily as important 
as cases detailing the partner-to-partner duties within general 
partnerships.17 
cited by Wilkes.  Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 
1970). Schwartz contains the following pivotal passage: 
Departure from precisely uniform treatment of stockholders may be justified, 
of course, where a bona fide business purpose indicates that the best interests 
of the corporation would be served by such departure. The burden of coming 
forward with proof of such justification shifts to the directors where, as here, a 
prima facie case of unequal stockholder treatment is made out.  Particularly is 
this so when it appears that members of the board of directors favored them­
selves individually over the complaining shareholder.  Additionally, distur­
bance of equality of stock ownership in a corporation closely held for several 
years by the members of two families calls for special justification in the cor­
porate interest; not only must it be shown that it was sought to achieve a bona 
fide independent business objective, but as well that such objective could not 
have been accomplished substantially as effectively by other means which 
would not have disturbed proportionate stock ownership. 
Id.  Note, however, that the Donahue rule applies more broadly than the Schwartz rule. 
Moreover, Donahue has been cited approximately six times more often than Schwartz. 
See supra  note 3 and KEYCITE CITING REFERENCES: Schwartz  v. Marien, WESTLAW, R 
www.westlaw.com (search for Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487 and following the 
“Citing References” link) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011) (listing 248 documents). 
14. Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 & n.2 (Del. 1996) (rejecting 
special shareholder-to-shareholder duties under Delaware law, where the corporation 
had not elected to be governed by the close corporation statute). 
15. Dunbar v. Williams, 554 So. 2d 56, 69 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Wilkes to 
“note that some states protect minority shareholders in closely held corporations from 
termination without cause” but deciding that Louisiana law gives no such protection). 
16. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 
1975). 
17. See generally Thompson, supra note 13.  The pioneer in this area of law was F. R 
Hodge O’Neal. See e.g. F. Hodge O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Pro­
tecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121 (1987) (“Unfair treatment of holders 
of minority interests in family companies and other closely held corporations by per­
sons in control of those corporations is so widespread that it is a national business scan­
dal.”).  Indeed, it is possible to argue that the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
(RUPA) overlooks partner-to-partner duties. See generally REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 
(1997) [hereinafter RUPA]. RUPA § 404 purports to exhaustively codify all fiduciary 
duties owed by partners and thereby “cabin in” the danger that courts might use fiduci­
ary duty to undercut partnership agreements. See id. § 404.  However, the specified 
duties each serve to protect the entity, rather than the partners. Id.  “The ‘cabin in’ 
approach ignores the implicit fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of members to avoid op­
pressing fellow members, produces great difficulty in dealing with member-to-member 
disclosure obligations in member-to-member buy-sell transactions, and puts inordinate 
pressure on the concept of ‘good faith and fair dealing.’”  Daniel S. Kleinberger & 
Carter G. Bishop, The Next Generation: The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Com­
pany Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 515, 522-23 (2007) (footnotes omitted) (explaining why the 
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Granted, Donahue did more than make the partnership anal­
ogy.  As noted above, the case made “utmost good faith” promi­
nent in the close corporation lexicon.18  But that label is so vague as 
to be almost meaningless, except in circumstances in which the ma­
jority has committed the close corporation equivalent of a “back 
alley mugging.”19  “[R]ecognizing the fiduciary nature of a relation­
ship does not give it content in any given context.”20 
At first glance, the following pronouncement from Donahue 
might seem to provide guidance: “Stockholders in close corpora­
tions must discharge their management and stockholder respon­
sibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard. They 
may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in deroga­
tion of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the 
corporation.”21  Careful reading, however, reveals ambiguity: i.e., 
is self-interest per se in derogation of the duty of loyalty, or is 
self-interest wrongful only to the extent that it derogates the loy­
alty duty? Donahue provides no answer.22 
18. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515; see supra note 6 and accompanying text. R 
19. Fine phrasing and practical guidance often fail to align. For example, Charles 
E. Clark praised the judicial careers and personal attributes of two cousins, Learned 
and Augustus Hand, who both served on the Second Circuit, noting that “Learned 
Hand’s brilliant and volatile nature, coupled with his unusual stylistic gifts, has served 
to render him better known to the general public than his cousin.”  Charles E. Clark, 
Augustus Noble Hand, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1957).  Clark, however, quoted 
“Justice Jackson’s classic barb uttered in an evening of general acclaim: ‘In short, just a 
word of advice to you district judges here present: Always quote Learned and follow 
Gus.’” Id. Out of filial respect, I note that I first learned this aphorism from my father, 
a member of the New York bar. 
20. Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
21. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
22. The same criticism applies to Cardozo’s beautiful phrasings: 
Cardozo’s words are quite vague.  It is one thing to say in general, “be your 
brother’s keeper,” but how does the principle apply when, for instance, your 
brother wants to watch the opera, you want to watch the football game, and 
your house has only one TV and no TiVo, DVR, or VCR? What does “the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive” mean when the two partners in an at-
will partnership are discussing a change in profit shares because one partner 
believes she is bringing in most of the business? 
DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND LLCS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLA­
NATIONS § 9.8.1, at 285-86 (3d ed. 2008) (footnote omitted) (quoting Meinhard v. 
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).  A controversial provision in the Revised Uni­
form Partnership Act recognizes this problem.  RUPA provides: “A partner does not 
violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement merely 
because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own interest.” RUPA § 404(e). 
The Official Comment explains: 
Subsection (e) is new and deals expressly with a very basic issue on which 
the UPA is silent.  A partner as such is not a trustee and is not held to the
 
same standards as a trustee.  Subsection (e) makes clear that a partner’s con­
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Donahue does contain one practical, operational holding—the 
so-called “equal opportunity” rule: 
When [a] corporation reacquiring its own stock is a close corpo­
ration, the purchase is subject to the . . . requirement, in the light 
of our holding in this opinion, that the stockholders, who, as di­
rectors or controlling stockholders, caused the corporation to 
enter into the stock purchase agreement, must have acted with 
the utmost good faith and loyalty to the other stockholders. 
To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares were pur­
chased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling 
stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stock­
holder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares 
to the corporation at an identical price.23 
For a while, this rule generated interesting jurisprudential rip-
ples–both as to the per se rule itself24 and to the definition of “the 
controlling group.”25  Today, however, the per se rule has few (if 
duct is not deemed to be improper merely because it serves the partner’s own 
individual interest. 
That admonition has particular application to the duty of loyalty and the 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.  It underscores the partner’s rights as 
an owner and principal in the enterprise, which must always be balanced 
against his duties and obligations as an agent and fiduciary. For example, a 
partner who, with consent, owns a shopping center may, under subsection (e), 
legitimately vote against a proposal by the partnership to open a competing 
shopping center. 
RUPA § 404 cmt. 5.  The provision was replicated in the Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act § 305(c) (2001), but omitted from the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act.  “This language is inappropriate in the complex and variegated world of LLCs.  As 
a proposition of contract law, the language is axiomatic and therefore unnecessary.  In 
the context of fiduciary duty, the language is at best incomplete, at worst wrong, and in 
any event confusing.” REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 cmt. to subsection e 
(1996). 
23. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518 (footnote omitted). 
24. E.g., Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 652-53 (Md. 1985) (re­
jecting a per se equal opportunity rule; finding no harm where the plaintiff did not lose 
any voting power because she was and remained a minority shareholder); Sundberg v. 
Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to con­
sider equal opportunity rule; interpreting relevant statute to limit buyout remedy to 
corporations with thirty-five or fewer shareholders), superseded by statute, Minn. Stat. 
§ 302A.751 (1994), as recognized in Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 981 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (adopting the equal opportunity rule because the duty of the 
“controlling shareholder group . . . [was] substantially akin to that fiduciary duty owed 
by one partner to another, to deal inter sese in the utmost good faith”). 
25. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19; see e.g., Schroer, 482 N.E.2d at 977 n.1 
(describing the complex capital structure that created a family control group); Demou­
las v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., No. 90-2927(B), 1995 WL 476772, at *81 (Mass. 
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any) adherents (not even Massachusetts),26 and the most interesting 
questions as to control with close corporations pertain to power ex­
ercised by minority shareholders, or more pointedly, issue-specific 
control.27 
In sum, today Donahue is most interesting as a matter of his­
tory and fine language.  As a practical guide to conduct, it has little 
relevance. 
II. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF WILKES 
Wilkes, in contrast, has significant continuing relevance. To ap­
preciate that relevance requires an understanding of what I have 
elsewhere termed “schizoid fiduciary duty.”28  In a classic fiduciary 
relationship, the fiduciary owes undivided loyalty to the party pro­
tected by the fiduciary’s duty.29  Strict rules prohibit competition, 
Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1995) (finding a control group comprised of “closely-knit” individuals 
who had common interests and acted in concert to manage the companies). 
26. See Powell v. MVE Holdings, Inc., 626 N.W.2d 451, 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting “that the Massachusetts Supreme Court later retreated from the Donahue hold­
ing in [Wilkes] because legitimate business reasons may exist for treating different 
shareholders differently” (citation omitted)).  Even with the Donahue facts, a Massa­
chusetts court would allow the majority shareholders to assert a legitimate business 
purpose, thereby circumventing a categorical breach of duty. See Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976); see also infra note 44 and ac- R 
companying text. 
27. E.g., A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (consid­
ering a minority shareholder’s threat to sell his stock to someone ineligible to own stock 
in a S corporation and stating “because [the would-be seller’s] actions will determine 
whether the Company retains its advantageous S status, he unquestionably has control 
over that issue”); Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853-54 (Mass. 1988) (holding 
that control can exist within a minority block); Smith v. Atl. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 
798, 802 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (“The 80% [supermajority approval] provision [applica­
ble to declaring dividends] may have substantially the effect of reversing the usual roles 
of the majority and the minority shareholders. The minority, under that provision, be­
comes an ad hoc controlling interest.”). 
28. Kleinberger & Bishop, supra note 17, at 526; see also KLEINBERGER, supra R 
note 22, § 9.8.5, at 293 (noting that in “Partner-to-partner transactions (when partners R 
engage each other in partnership-related financial transactions) . . . [and in a] Partners’ 
exercise of discretion vis-à-vis copartners . . . one partner’s interests will inevitably be 
adverse to another’s”). 
29. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“[I]t is elemental 
that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those whose interests 
the fiduciary is to protect. This is a sensitive and ‘inflexible’ rule of fidelity, barring not 
only blatant self-dealing, but also requiring avoidance of situations in which a fiduci­
ary’s personal interest possibly conflicts with the interest of those owed a fiduciary 
duty.” (citations omitted)); Van Noy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 574, 581 
n.2 (Wash.  2001) (“The duty of a fiduciary to his beneficiary is essentially that of a 
trustee. A fiduciary ‘is bound to act in the highest good faith toward his beneficiary’ and 
he may never seek to gain an advantage over his beneficiary by any means.  A fiduciary 
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usurpation of opportunity, and self-dealing, and self-interest is per­
missible only with informed consent.30 
Within a closely held business, however, the situation is 
different.  When an owner functions as an entity manager, standard 
duties do apply.31  But when oppression is alleged, the construct 
changes; in that context, the co-owners are not classic fiduciaries.32 
For one thing, each co-owner is simultaneously both a fiduciary ob­
ligee and a fiduciary obligor.33  For another, each co-owner has 
some right to pursue self interest.34  For example, when a compen­
sation committee decides bonuses for all the firms’ owners, the situ­
ation certainly requires more exacting standards than “morals of 
must give priority to his beneficiary’s best interest whenever he acts on the beneficiary’s 
behalf.  A fiduciary owes his beneficiary a duty of undivided loyalty, meaning that a 
fiduciary cannot abandon or stray from this relationship to further his own interests.” 
(quoting Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their In­
sureds, 88 KY. L.J. 1, 2 (2000))). 
30. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Del. 1939) (discussing unautho­
rized acts of a corporate officer and doctrines relating to “self-interest,” corporate op­
portunity, and anti-competition); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF  AGENCY §§ 8.02-.04 
(2006); AM. LAW  INST., PRINCIPLES OF  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE §§ 5.02, 5.04-.06 
(1994). 
31. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30 and 8.31 (2008) (stating conduct and liability 
standards for all directors and making no reference to any exclusion or different rule for 
directors of close corporations); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 1 (stating 
that “Section 8.30(a) establishes the basic standards of conduct for all directors” and 
that “[i]ts command is to be understood as peremptory—its obligations are to be ob­
served by every director” (emphasis added)); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good 
Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in Closely Held Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1143 , 1145 (1990).  The situation is more complicated when controlling shareholders 
damage or despoil the company in order to expropriate the value due to a minority 
shareholder.  Those situations are beyond the scope of this Article, and essentially raise 
questions of the distinction between direct and derivative lawsuits. See Daniel S. 
Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of Limited Liability Companies, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 121-25 (2006); Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct 
vs. Derivative, or “What’s a Lawsuit Between Friends in an ‘Incorporated Partner­
ship?’”, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1203, 1270-71 (1996). 
32. See Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 365-66 (Mont. 
1990) (distinguishing cases relied on by the trial court because, although those cases 
concerned fiduciary duty (agency law and an executor’s trusteeship over the assets of 
the decedent’s estate), they did not involve “the unique relationship between share­
holders of a close corporation”). 
33. This situation is comparable to the situation of mutual agency among general 
partners in a non-LLP general partnership.  Each partner is simultaneously an agent of 
the other partners and one of the principals comprising the partnership. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF  AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958) (stating that, in “usual” circumstances, “a 
partner is a general agent for the other members of the group”). 
34. RUPA § 404 cmt. 1 (1997) (“Arguably, the term ‘fiduciary’ is inappropriate 
when used to describe the duties of a partner because a partner may legitimately pursue 
self-interest . . . .”). 
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the market place.”35  But just as certainly, classic fiduciary rules do 
not make sense.  Likewise, what does selflessness mean when a 
majority of owners exercise a “guillotine” expulsion provision, per­
mitting them to oust a fellow owner without cause and without even 
an opportunity for a hearing?36  Or what does it mean when con­
trolling shareholders determine what to do with a shareholder 
employee who is engaging in sexual harassment?37  “[E]ven if 
[co-owners] are never fully at arm’s length, they are nonetheless 
occasionally on opposite sides of the negotiating table.  In such cir­
cumstances, self interest is inherent and inevitable.”38 
To use the term “schizoid” to describe the resulting obligations 
may seem pejorative.  One dictionary defines the word as “an of­
fensive term describing a personality that suggests inner conflicts 
and exhibits outer contradictions.”39  But pejorative or not, the def­
inition is apt in the context of owner-to-owner duties. Without a 
proper lens, the relationship and the duties appear in conflict and in 
contradiction.  For example, what does “utmost good faith” mean 
when an employer-shareholder is terminated for, among other 
things, assaulting a fellow shareholder and doing criminal damage 
to a customer’s property?40  What does “utmost good faith” require 
when an employer-shareholder is terminated for misusing company 
funds and intimidating both customers and employees?41 
For such situations Wilkes makes two substantial contributions. 
The first is conceptual. Wilkes expressly recognizes the schizoid 
reality: 
[W]e are concerned that untempered application of the strict 
good faith standard enunciated in Donahue . . . will result in the 
imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling 
group in a close corporation which will unduly hamper its effec­
35. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
36. Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 191 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2001); Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 
22768666, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003); P.F. Jurgs & Co. v. O’Brien, 629 A.2d 
325, 327 (Vt. 1993); Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 518-19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
37. See Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 517-18 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
38. KLEINBERGER, supra note 22, § 9.8.5, at 292. R 
39. Schizoid Definition, MSN ENCARTA  DICTIONARY, http://encarta.msn.com/ 
encnet/features/dictionary/dictionaryresults.aspx?lextype=3&search=schizoid (last vis­
ited Jan. 9, 2011). 
40. See infra notes 113-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pooley v. R 
Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. App. 1994). 
41. See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of Edenbaum R 
v. Schwarcz-Osztreicherne, 885 A.2d 365 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). 
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tiveness in managing the corporation in the best interests of all 
concerned.  The majority, concededly, have certain rights to what 
has been termed “selfish ownership” in the corporation which 
should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obliga­
tion to the minority.42 
The second contribution is practical. Wilkes provides an oper­
ational rule for determining whether a particular act or course of 
conduct breaches the majority’s “fiduciary obligation to the minor­
ity” or instead reflects the legitimate rights of selfish ownership.43 
[W]hen minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit 
against the majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty 
owed to them by the majority, . . . [i]t must be asked whether the 
controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose 
for its action. 
When an asserted business purpose for their action is ad­
vanced by the majority, however, we think it is open to minority 
stockholders to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective 
could have been achieved through an alternative course of action 
less harmful to the minority’s interest.  If called on to settle a 
dispute, our courts must weigh the legitimate business purpose, if 
any, against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.44 
III. DETAILING AND UNDERSTANDING THE WILKES TEST 
The “Wilkes test” has four steps, although the first is actually 
assumed in the Wilkes opinion (and therefore I label it step zero). 
Step zero begins with the complaining minority shareholder making 
a plausible claim that the majority’s conduct has affected an argua­
bly protected right of the complainant.45  Without such a showing, 
the defendants should not be required to justify their conduct.  Any 
other approach would encourage nuisance suits, which would itself 
ignore “the fact that the controlling group in a close corporation 
must have some room to maneuver in establishing the business pol­
icy of the corporation.”46  The cases do not linger on this point. 
42. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. (citations omitted). 
45. Id. (noting that “when minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit 
against the majority alleging a breach of . . . duty . . . [the court] must carefully analyze 
the action taken by the controlling stockholders . . . ask[ing] whether the controlling 
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When loss of employment is at issue, the showing is made almost 
automatically.47  For less dramatic employment-related claims, use­
ful authority is available from the sometimes analogous realm of 
discrimination law.  “An adverse employment action is not a trivial 
offense or petty slight.”48  For example, a claim that one’s office has 
been relocated or repainted49 should not trigger the next step of the 
Wilkes analysis. 
Assuming the plaintiff surmounts step zero, step one provides 
that the majority is obliged to demonstrate a legitimate business 
purpose.50  In many cases, the analysis stops here.51  In a classic sit­
uation of aggression and expropriation, the defendants cannot meet 
their burden of proof.  Thus, in the close corporation version of a 
“back alley mugging,” the multi-step Wilkes test is unnecessary, but 
its application is benign and speedy. 
If the defendants surmount step one, step two requires the 
complainant to prove a less harmful alternative for addressing the 
demonstrated legitimate business purpose.52  This step is the genius 
of the Wilkes test, recognizing that neither the apparent infringe­
ment of complainant’s rights nor the legitimate rationale of those 
running the business should be automatically dispositive.53  If each 
side is in part right and in part wrong, then an all-or-nothing rule 
will routinely produce bad results.  This step allows the court a lim­
ited role in second-guessing the business judgment of the majority 
and therefore conduces majorities toward special care in dealing 
with the interests of minority shareholders. This step also imposes 
47. The majority of oppression claims involve loss of employment. See Kathleen 
L. Kuhlman, Beyond Crosby v. Beam: Ohio Courts Extend Protection of Minority 
Stockholders of Close Corporations, 27 AKRON L. REV. 477, 479 (1994); Peter A. Mah­
ler, Twenty Years of Court Decisions Have Clarified Shareholder Rights Under BCL 
§§ 1104-a and 1118, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 31 (1999). 
48. Quinn v. St. Louis Cnty., No. 09-1372 ADM/LIB, 2010 WL 3733970, at *5 (D. 
Minn.  Sept. 20, 2010) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 
68 (2006)). 
49. Id. at *1. The Wilkes analysis is also powerful in cases involving non-em­
ployee shareholders, but such cases are beyond the scope of this Article. 
50. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
51. See, e.g., id.  Exactly this result occurred in Wilkes.  “Applying this approach 
to the instant case it is apparent that the majority stockholders in Springside have not 
shown a legitimate business purpose for severing Wilkes from the payroll of the corpo­
ration or for refusing to reëlect [sic] him as a salaried officer and director.” Id.; see also 
A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997); Glydon v. Conway, 
No. 01-P-1414, 2003 WL 21665004, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. July 16, 2003); Beers v. Tis-
dale, 603 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
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on the complainant the task of explaining how—accepting the ma­
jority’s legitimate purpose—the majority used needlessly harmful 
means, thereby requiring the complainant to consider the practical 
problems caused by the complainant’s own conduct. This proposi­
tion follows inecluctably from the structure of the Wilkes approach. 
If the majority’s legitimate purpose involves responding to the com­
plainant’s misconduct, the complainant will have to demonstrate a 
better way of dealing with that misconduct. 
Most cases that reach this stage end here with a decision for 
the defendants.54  In addition, step two provides guidance to law­
yers seeking a compromise resolution—i.e., a structure for 
discourse.55 
If the analysis reaches step three, the court balances the com­
peting claims of the parties, “weigh[ing] the legitimate business pur­
pose . . . against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.”56 
Few, if any cases, reach this stage.57  The balancing would presuma­
bly involve: (i) the importance of the business purpose; (ii) the 
54. E.g., Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 20-22 (1st Cir. 
2002) (holding that a legitimate business purpose existed where the shareholders had 
justifiable reasons to vote against a merger); Holland v. Burke, No. BACV200500122A, 
2008 WL 4514664, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 18, 2008) (finding a legitimate business 
purpose of “preserv[ing] and continu[ing] the successful operation of the” company); 
Harris v. Mardan Bus. Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353-54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (hold­
ing that termination of employment due to poor performance was a legitimate business 
purpose). But see Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 818 n.23 (Mass. 2009) (“We 
take the judge’s conclusion that the allegations against Pointer were not grounds for his 
termination to mean that the defendants have not established a legitimate business pur­
pose for the termination. . . .  In the one area where the judge found that Pointer en­
gaged in any misconduct, his political contributions, we agree with the judge that 
termination was not necessary; a simple discussion would have been enough.  In any 
event, Pointer reimbursed FGC.”). 
55. See Smith v. Atl. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 802-03 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) 
(referring to “[t]he . . . pertinent guidance . . . found in the Wilkes case, essentially to 
the effect that in any judicial intervention in such a situation there must be a weighing 
of the business interests advanced as reasons for their action (a) by the majority or 
controlling group and (b) by the rival persons or group” and stating that “[i]t would 
obviously be appropriate, before a court-ordered solution is sought or imposed, for 
both sides to attempt to reach a sensible solution of any incipient impasse in the interest 
of all concerned after consideration of all relevant circumstances” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
56. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
57. See Alder Food Distribs., Inc. v. Keating, No. 0000748, 2000 WL 33170823, at 
*5-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 6, 2000) (contemplating alternative remedial actions; hold­
ing that there were less harmful alternatives to an indefinite suspension without pay in 
response to a minority shareholder’s improper management techniques; recognizing 
that the majority shareholder had reasonable grounds to impose punishment, but the 
chosen disciplinary actions were “far too harmful a means of achieving a legitimate 
business objective”). 
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question of acceptable “margin of error” risk in devising a method 
to serve that purpose;58 and (iii) any demerits in the proffered alter­
native—especially issues as to practicality and concerns as to 
whether the alternative would serve the business purpose equally as 
well as the majority’s chosen course of action. 
IV. APPRECIATING THE WILKES TEST AS A LEGAL CONSTRUCT 
As will be seen below, the Wilkes test can work remarkably 
well in resolving schizoid issues.59  But Wilkes is also remarkable 
from a purely conceptual perspective.  Although the Wilkes test 
was novel when announced, its structure and components were not. 
The Wilkes rule takes its structure from McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green,60 a famous case in an adjacent area of law. The rule’s 
content is a variation on the business judgment rule, a major theme 
of corporate law.61  These borrowings are sub silentio but nonethe­
less apparent. 
Legal authorities differ on the virtues of putting new wine in 
old bottles,62 but Wilkes did well to do so.  Appropriate borrowing 
58. For example, a purpose might be both very important and very fragile—i.e., 
with little margin for error in effectuating the purpose.  In that case, the balance would 
tilt against the plaintiff. 
59. See infra Part V. 
60. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 792 (1973). 
61. See Bender v. Swartz, 917 A.2d 142, 152-53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007); Uni­
trin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372-73 (Del. 1995). 
62. See, e.g., Cumberland Corp. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 383 F. Supp. 
595, 599 n.1 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (“The repeated difficulties encountered with limitations 
issues in products liability cases in Tennessee is illustrative of the need for careful and 
thorough legislative revision in this area of the law. . . .  Instead of making a re-evalua­
tion of the interests of the plaintiff, of the defendant and of the public, and developing a 
rational system of limitations in the light of the developing law of products liability, 
there has been a seesaw judicial and legislative attempt in Tennessee to fill old bottles 
with new wine.  The inevitable result of this approach has been some cracking of the 
bottles.  This cracking will no doubt continue until there has been an appropriate legis­
lative revision of the law in this area.”); United States v. Silvia, 28 F.2d 73, 74 (D. Wyo. 
1928) (quoting Mark 2:22: “And no man putteth new wine into old bottles; else the new 
wine doth burst the bottles, and the wine is spilled, and the bottles will be marred; but 
new wine must be put into new bottles”); cf.  Williams v. Emp’rs Liab. Assur. Corp., 296 
F.2d 569, 580 (5th Cir. 1961) (discussing Louisiana law: “In civilian jurisdictions new 
wine in old bottles is not a deceitful trick.  It is inherent in the evolutive construction 
that is essential to making a code live and work.”); Marshak v. Marshak, No. 088766, 
1992 WL 11168, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 1992) (“[T]he pouring of new wine into 
old bottles is a technique well known to the common law.”), rev’d, 628 A.2d 
964 (Conn. 1993), overruled by State v. Vakilzaden, 742 A.2d 767 (Conn. 1999); Winton 
D. Woods, Burnham v. Superior Court: New Wine, Old Bottles, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. 
REV. 199, 205 (1990) (citing De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 45 (1901)).  I thank Profes­
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reduces the learning curves for lawyers and the cognitive burden for 
courts.  Analogy, extrapolation, and comparison remain fundamen­
tal tenets of legal reasoning; the common law grew by analogy in 
part because lawyers are accustomed to using customary conceptual 
tools.63  Thus, to create a new rule out of familiar parts can be to 
increase the tool’s utility to its users. 
Certainly the structure of the Wilkes rule is user-friendly, even 
though the rule itself is quite complex. The burden-shifting ap­
proach both creates and makes manageable much of that complex­
ity, while creating a rule that allows for nuanced analysis. Wilkes 
was decided only two years after the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which es­
tablished a burden-shifting analysis for Title VII disparate impact 
claims64 and quickly became one of the most important burden-
makes better sense when the words refer to putting old wine into new wineskins. See, 
e.g., The Gospel of Thomas 47 (Thomas O. Lambdin trans., Forgotten Books 2007), 
available at http://www.gnosis.org/naghamm/gthlamb.html (stating that “new wine is not 
put into old wineskins, lest they burst”); Luke 5:37 (Revised Standard Version) (“And 
no one puts new wine into old wineskins; if he does, the new wine will burst the skins 
and it will be spilled, and the skins will be destroyed”). But see Luke 5:36-39 (King 
James) (“And no man putteth new wine into old bottles; else the new wine will burst 
the bottles, and be spilled, and the bottles shall perish.”). 
63. See Marshak, 1992 WL 11168, at *9; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic 
Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1552 
(2010) (“In the common law, . . . [c]ourts extrapolate rules and principles from their 
prior decisions, applying them to the specific dispute at hand.  In the process, the court 
fashions a new rule or exception by drawing from disparate areas of tort, contract, resti­
tution, and property law—relying entirely on logic and experience.”); Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 45 (1998) (“There is nothing inherently surprising about a 
judicial turn to analogy as a tool for making sense of a novel form of evidence.  Ana­
logic reasoning is a legal mainstay, or as Cass Sunstein put it, legal culture’s ‘most char­
acteristic way of proceeding.’  Judges’ particular expertise is in reasoning through 
comparison; this process is at the very heart of the common law. When confronting a 
novel form of evidence, then, why not compare the new to the known?” (footnotes 
omitted)); Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1179, 1188 (1999) (“[T]he practice of analogical reasoning from past decisions has 
procedural benefits that go beyond the rational force it carries in any particular case.  It 
produces a habit, a method, that will lead judges to do the intellectual work of study 
and comparison.”); Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of The 
American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 68 (1983) (stating that “[t]he ‘context 
public figure’ concept is an attempt to extrapolate from the traditional common law 
privileges”). 
64. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 792.  As the District Court for the 
District of Connecticut recently summarized: 
The Supreme Court has established a three-part, burden-shifting test for eval­
uating the evidence in an employment discrimination case. First, the plaintiff 
bears a “minimal” burden of establishing a prima facie discrimination case. 
The plaintiff can generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating: (1) 
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shifting case in U.S. law.65 Wilkes does not cite McDonnell Doug­
las, but the parallel is inescapable. 
Of course, the parallelism does not extend to what must be 
shown at each stage of the analysis, because the elements of the 
legal rules are quite different.  Moreover, the burdens are not the 
same.  For example, step one of the Wilkes test requires the major­
ity shareholder to prove a legitimate business purpose,66 while 
under the second step of McDonnell Douglas “[t]he defendant 
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the 
proffered reasons.  It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises 
a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the 
plaintiff.”67  Nonetheless, the structural similarity makes Wilkes 
easy for neophytes to grasp—“ah, a multistep burden shifting test, 
just like McDonnell Douglas.” 
Substantively, the Wilkes test feels familiar as a variation on 
the business judgment rule.  Although jurisdictions differ on how 
they state and apply that venerable rule, essentially the rule: (i) 
obliges those with ultimate management authority to comply with 
the duties of loyalty and care;68 (ii) recognizes that the duty of care 
membership in the protected group; (2) satisfactory performance in the posi­
tion; (3) termination; and (4) replacement, or attempted replacement, of the 
plaintiff with an employee whose qualifications do not exceed those of the 
plaintiff.  Second, the defendant bears the burden of rebutting the presump­
tion of discrimination by proffering a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” 
for the adverse employment action.  Third, once the aforementioned presump­
tion has been rebutted, the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s proffered 
reason was a pretext for discrimination. 
Hyde v. Beverly Hills Suites, LLC, 265 F.R.D. 61, 63 (D. Conn. 2010) (citations 
omitted). 
65. See, e.g., Fox v. Giaccia, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2006) (referring to “the 
familiar burden-shifting test articulated in the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green”).  In the first eighteen months following its announcement by the 
Court, McDonnell Douglas was cited in at least 114 cases on the issue of burden shift­
ing. ALLCASES: MCDONNELL  DOUGLAS  CORP. V. GREEN, www.westlaw.com (search 
for (mcdonnell douglas corp. /s green) & (burden /s shift!) & date(before 1976) % 
ti(mcdonnell)) (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
66. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 
1976). 
67. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (citation 
omitted).  For those with an ear to constitutional jurisprudence, step three of Wilkes 
might sound as if cribbed from constitutional jurisprudence involving fundamental in­
terests. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973) 
(“[W]here state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or 
liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative.”). The Wilkes 
burden is considerably milder, however. 
68. 3A WILLIAM  MEADE  FLETCHER, FLETCHER  CYCLOPEDIA OF THE  LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036, at 36-37 (rev. perm. ed. 2002). 
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has both a process aspect and a substantive (or outcome) aspect, 
but in ordinary circumstances accords minimal importance to the 
outcome aspect;69 and (iii) presumes that those with management 
authority have met their duties, thereby placing the burden of proof 
on plaintiffs.70 
For extraordinary circumstances, courts have tweaked or 
twisted this basic formulation. For example, both Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co.71 and Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado72 make seri­
ous use of the substantive aspect of the duty of care.  Under Uno­
cal, “outcome” due care appears as the requirement that “a 
defensive measure . . . be reasonable in relation to the threat 
posed.”73 Zapata (in)famously subjects a special litigation commit­
tee’s good faith and reasonable investigation to a substantive re­
view under the rubric of the court’s “own independent business 
judgment” in situations where pre-suit demand is excused as fu­
tile.74  Extraordinary circumstances also affect the burden of proof. 
For example, if a plaintiff successfully rebuts the presumption of 
loyalty, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove “entire 
fairness.”75 
Wilkes recognizes that the close corporation is itself an ex­
traordinary circumstance and revises the business judgment in two 
69. Thus it is almost impossible to find an ordinary duty of care case in which the 
directors used acceptable process but were found wanting for having nonetheless 
achieved an unreasonably bad outcome.  “When applying the duty of care, courts focus 
their inquiry on management’s efforts in arriving at the decision rather than on the 
wisdom of the decision itself.”  3A WILLIAM  MEADE  FLETCHER, FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036, at 39-40. 
70. Id. § 1036, at 36, 39. 
71. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
72. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981). 
73. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955. 
74. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 789.  Although Zapata characterizes this “second 
step” as “the essential key in striking the balance between legitimate corporate claims 
as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a corporation’s best interests as ex­
pressed by an independent investigating committee,” subsequent case law backs off 
from the two-step in several ways. Id.; e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774-75 
(Del. 1990) (holding that derivative plaintiffs who make a demand admit that demand is 
not futile); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Del. 1985) (holding that, even when 
demand has been excused as futile, the trial court is not obligated to engage in the 
second step under Zapata); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813-15 (Del. 1984) (setting 
high barriers to a demand futility claim and thereby restricting the circumstances in 
which Zapata applies). 
75. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citation omit­
ted); accord Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 180 (Mass. 
1997). 
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important ways.  First, the defendants’ loyalty is not presumed.76 
They must demonstrate a legitimate business purpose.77  Second, 
Wilkes gives meaning to the outcome aspect of the duty of care.78 
Although the plaintiff has the burden of proof, the court will at 
least consider whether the defendants might have achieved their 
goals through different methods.79 
V. APPRECIATING THE POWER OF WILKES 
Wilkes is most important when both sides can justifiably point 
fingers at each other.  Most oppression cases involve a claimed ex­
pectation of continued employment,80 and when the majority ac­
cuses the terminated shareholder-employee of misconduct, the 
ordinary analytic tools work poorly.  Many cases use the “reasona­
ble expectations” approach, asking whether the terminated em­




79. Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990) 
(applying Wilkes and stating “[t]his Court is not in a position to make a corporation’s 
business decision when the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate business 
purpose for its decision and the minority shareholder cannot demonstrate the practica­
bility of a less harmful alternative”).  Note that sometimes the outcome of a decision 
making process can be a decision to implement a process. E.g., Lyondell Chemical Co. 
v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009) (discussing the so-called Revlon duties applicable 
when a Delaware corporation is “up for sale” and holding that the board must consider 
an acceptable process but not necessarily follow the particular process laid out in Rev­
lon, Inc. v. MacAndres & Forbes Holdings, Inc.).  For example, a close corporation with 
a shareholder-employee who has a drinking problem might deliberate on what to do 
and then require the employee to comply with a process of alcohol education and treat­
ment as a condition to retaining his or her job. Heiser v. Heiser & Jesko, No. 2004-L­
006, 2005 WL 2211130, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2005) (quoting a letter that pro­
vided: “‘As a direct result of your unacceptable actions, behavior and conduct we will 
proceed with the terms of expulsion pursuant to the provisions of the Close Corpora­
tion Agreement dated December 5, 1997 unless you agree to enter an accredited “Sub­
stance Abuse Program” that is agreeable to a majority of the shareholders and that you 
thereafter conform in all respects to the program’s requisites’”).  In the terminology 
used in the text, requiring that process of education and treatment would be an out­
come—subject to the outcome aspect of the duty of care. 
80. Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Ven­
ture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corpora­
tions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 46 n.141 (1982) (“Many would argue that the denial of 
employment [to a shareholder] is a classic example of oppression.”); Douglas K. Moll, 
Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspec­
tive, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 755 (2000) (“[N]umerous litigated cases involve sharehold­
ers challenging their terminations as oppressive . . . .”). 
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ployee reasonably expected continuing employment.81  While this 
approach has been effective in determining circumstances in which 
a well-behaving, well-performing co-owner might reasonably expect 
a job,82 the approach does little to handle situations in which the co­
owner has performed poorly.  In such circumstances, a court has a 
Hobson’s Choice.83  Finding a reasonable expectation of continued 
employment despite the misconduct subjects the company to liabil­
ity for lost wages, plus either compelled dividends or a buyout.84  To 
find that the misconduct undercuts any reasonable expectation of 
employment is to sentence the miscreant to a frozen-in investment. 
Two cases will illustrate the problem. In 2005, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals determined that a forced buyout might be neces­
sary even where the minority’s misconduct was egregious.85 
Edenbaum v. Schwarcz-Osztreicherne involved a corporation that 
owned and operated an assisted living facility.86  The corporation 
had two shareholders: Edenbaum, the majority shareholder (51%) 
and Schwarcz-Osztreicherne, the minority shareholder (49%) re­
ferred to in the opinion as Schwarcz.87  At the outset, both share­
holders worked in the business, and both received a salary.88 
Eventually, however, Edenbaum determined that Schwarcz was be­
81. E.g., Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 190 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he threshold question in the context of a claim of share­
holder oppression based on the termination of employment is whether a minority 
shareholder’s expectation of continuing employment is reasonable.”); In re Topper, 433 
N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that the “reasonable expectations [of contin­
ued participation in company operations] constitute the bargain of the parties in light of 
which subsequent conduct must be appraised”); Kortum v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 432, 
443 (N.D. 2008) (holding that “[t]he threshold issue” when reviewing a claim of share­
holder oppression arising from termination of employment “is whether the minority 
shareholder had a reasonable expectation of continued employment” (citation omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
82. E.g., Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 817 (Mass. 2009) (finding that mi­
nority shareholder who was innocent of wrong-doing had a reasonable expectation of 
continued employment as president of the company, and that expectation was frus­
trated when majority owners secretly hired his replacement and fired him as president); 
Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 803 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that minority 
shareholder had a reasonable expectation of lifetime employment that was violated af­
ter he was fired by his brothers for investigating accounting discrepancies). 
83. Hobson’s Choice, THE PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/ 
hobsons-choice.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2010) (A Hobson’s choice is “[n]o real choice 
at all—the only options being to either accept or refuse the offer that is given to you”). 
84. See, e.g., Edenbaum v. Schwarcz-Osztreicherne, 885 A.2d 365, 380-81 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2005). 
85. Id. at 381. 
86. Id. at 367. 
87. Id. at 368. 
88. Id. at 368-69. 
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having improperly toward the business in general and vulnerable 
patients in particular.89  After seeking unsuccessfully either to sell 
his stock to Schwarcz or buy her out, Edenbaum terminated 
Schwarcz’s employment and caused the corporation to stop paying 
her salary.90  The company had no profits and thus no dividends 
were paid.91 
Schwarcz sued, claiming oppression and seeking dissolution.92 
At trial, Edenbaum provided substantial testimony of Schwarcz’s 
misconduct, including her failing to provide receipts for petty cash 
and grocery shopping, buying gourmet and Hungarian food for her­
self with company money, “transcribing medications from doctors’ 
orders” even though she did not know how; and breaching patient 
confidentiality by faxing incident reports to her daughter for trans­
lation.93  In addition, witnesses stated that Schwarcz “had been 
‘rough’ with a patient . . . had ‘pick[ed]’ [a] patient ‘up by the dia­
per’ and had called another patient ‘ugly.’”94 
According to Edenbaum, Schwarcz also had a poor relation­
ship with the staff.95  He stated that she “frighten[ed] and ‘de­
mean[ed]’ them” and “treated them as slaves.”96  In addition, she 
allowed her violent son to live at the facility.97  The son had alleg­
edly scared the patients and threatened Edenbaum’s life.98 
The circuit court held that “Edenbaum had the right, granted 
him by the shareholders’ agreement, to discharge Schwarcz from 
her position with the company”99 and reversed a trial court ruling 
that awarded Schwarcz back pay.100  However, the Court of Special 
Appeals held that terminating Schwarcz constituted oppression: 
The “reasonable expectations” view of oppressive conduct 
“[r]ecogniz[es] that a minority shareholder who reasonably ex­
pects that ownership in the corporation would entitle him to a 
job, a share of the corporate earnings, and a place in corporate 
89. Id. at 370. 
90. Id. at 369. 
91. Id. at 370-71. 
92. Id. at 369.  She made other claims as well, but they are not relevant here. Id. 
at 371. 
93. Id. at 370. 





99. Id. at 374. 
100. Id. at 375. 
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management would be ‘oppressed’ in a very real sense [sic] when 
the majority seeks to defeat those expectations and there exists 
no effective means of salvaging the investment.”101 
At the inception of her relationship with Edenbaum, Schwarcz 
signed an agreement (the same one that authorized her 
dismissal).102 
[The agreement] provided that she would be employed as its Di­
rector of Operations with specified duties and at a salary equal to 
Edenbaum’s.  Moreover, as an officer and director of Liberty, 
she expected to continue to participate in shareholders’ meetings 
and receive company reports.  All that apparently ended when 
she was terminated from her position as Director of Operations. 
Her termination substantially defeated her reasonable expecta­
tions that she would be employed by the corporation, receive a 
salary, and take part in its management.103 
Even though “the circuit court did not find Edenbaum acted in 
bad faith,”104 Edenbaum had committed actionable oppression.105 
The relevant statute specified dissolution as the remedy, but the 
Maryland court joined courts of other states in interpreting the stat­
utory language to permit less draconian remedies.106  Relying on a 
West Virginia case for a lengthy list of alternatives, the court of 
appeals remanded the case for a determination as to whether some 
outcome short of dissolution might remedy the harm inflicted on 
Schwarcz.107 
The list included both forced dividends and a forced buyout,108 
but neither of those remedies would have been fair to Edenbaum or 
to the corporation.109  The corporation had essentially no profits,110 
and Schwarcz’s conduct had probably damaged the business.111 
Should the corporation have been required to borrow money in or­
der to pay dividends to a shareholder whose misconduct disquali­
fied her from employment? 
101. Id. at 379 (quoting Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987)). 
102. Id. at 368. 
103. Id. at 379. 
104. Id. at 381. 
105. Id. at 379-80. 
106. Id. at 380. 
107. Id. at 380-81 (citing Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 441 n.12 
(W.Va. 1980)). 
108. Id. 
109. See id. 
110. Id. at 370. 
111. Id. 
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A forced buyout would have been even worse, requiring the 
corporation (or its remaining owner) to go into debt in order to 
make liquid the miscreant’s ownership interest.  In essence, the 
court would be creating a “put” right for the miscreant.112 
A Minnesota case provides another example of this “miscreant 
put right.” Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc. involved an “un­
fair prejudice” claim by a shareholder employee whose employ­
ment had been terminated.113  The corporation had three 
shareholders, each named Pooley, and each owned one-third of the 
stock.114  “The trial court . . . did conclude that respondents [two of 
the three shareholders], as directors of Mankato’s board, unfairly 
prejudiced appellant by freezing him out of a business in which he 
reasonably expected to participate.”115 
However, the appellant was hardly a model employee: 
In the early 1980’s, appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting some­
one in the scope of his employment.  In 1989, appellant assaulted 
respondent Gregory Pooley.  He also damaged a customer’s 
truck.  As a result, a jury convicted appellant of assault and crimi­
nal damage to property.  Following this conviction, Mankato ter­
minated appellant’s employment.116 
Nonetheless, the trial court ordered a buyout,117 and the court 
of appeals left that order in place.118  The result: (i) a shareholder 
employee repeatedly engages in criminal conduct on the job,119 
doubtlessly disrupting and probably damaging the business; (ii) the 
other shareholders, seeking to protect the business, terminate the 
112. A “put” is “[a]n option to sell something (esp. securities) at a fixed price 
even if the market delines; the right to require another to buy.” BLACK’S  LAW  DIC­
TIONARY 1204 (9th ed. 2009).  Here, the analogy to such “put” is created when a court 
creates a right held by the minority shareholder to require that majority shareholders 
buyout the interest of the minority shareholder in a forced buyout. 
113. Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994).  Under Minnesota law, “unfair prejudice” rather than “oppression” is the term of 
art. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subdiv. 1(b)(3) (2010).  Another subdivision infuses “rea­
sonable expectations” into the concept of unfair prejudice. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, 
subdiv. 3a. 




118. Id. at 838.  In fairness to the court of appeals, I note that its hands were tied. 
The respondents did not appeal the ruling on unfair prejudice, seeking instead to get a 
discount on the buyout price due to appellant’s misconduct. Id. at 836.  The court of 
appeals rejected the discount argument and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 838. 
119. Id. at 836. 
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miscreant’s employment;120 and (iii) the court turns the sequence 
into a “fist in your face” put right. 
Now re-consider each of these cases under the Wilkes rule. 
The question ceases to be the “all or nothing” one of oppression vel 
non.  Instead, the plaintiffs assert their expectations of continued 
employment (step zero), triggering the majority’s burden of proving 
a legitimate business purpose (step one).121  In each of the two 
cases, proof was abundantly available to pass these first two 
steps.122  The burden would then shift to the plaintiff to show a less 
harmful alternative.  Each plaintiff would be hard pressed to do so. 
Each corporation acted to protect its business;123 it seems impru­
dent to continue the employment of someone who abuses vulnera­
ble patients or commits criminal damage to customer’s property. 
Perhaps plaintiff Schwarz could have argued that her conduct did 
not disqualify her from continuing to serve as a director of the cor­
poration, and plaintiff Pooley could have argued that the corpora­
tion should have sent him to anger management classes.  Even 
assuming success with these arguments, the remedy would have 
been far less intrusive and unfair than creating a put right for the 
miscreant.124 
Also under Wilkes’s step two, either plaintiff could have ar­
gued for paying dividends in lieu of salary, but each would have had 
the burden of proving such dividends practicable. The testimony in 
Edenbaum v. Osztreicherne indicated that the corporation lacked 
the resources to declare dividends.125 Pooley does not discuss the 
issue, because once the trial court ordered a forced buyout, finan­
cial practicality was irrelevant. 
Wilkes is not alone in attempting to counterpoise the rights of 
an evident miscreant and an allegedly overreacting majority. For 
example, Gimpel v. Bolstein dealt with the alleged oppression of a 
120. Id. 
121. See supra Part III. 
122. See Edenbaum v. Schwarcz-Osztreicherne, 885 A.2d 365, 370 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2005); Pooley, 513 N.W.2d at 836.  The analysis here assumes genuine claims of 
misconduct against the disgruntled shareholder.  For a case in which a court found mis­
conduct claims to be trumped up, see Cooke v. Fresh Express Foods Corp., 7 P.3d 717, 
723-24 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). 
123. See Edenbaum, 885 A.2d at 370; Pooley, 513 N.W.2d at 836. 
124. Serving as a director would not have brought Schwarz any return on her 
investment but might have allowed her to discern when (if ever) the corporation had 
the wherewithal to distribute profits.  Even then, however, the decision whether to 
make a distribution would lie within the business judgment of the majority.  Zidell v. 
Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977). 
125. Edenbaum, 885 A.2d at 370. 
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shareholder, Robert, who “was, in fact, a thief, [who] . . . stole from 
the family company, and was discharged from all company employ­
ment when his theft became known.”126  The ostracism was essen­
tially total: 
Since [the firing], Robert has received no benefits from his 
ownership position with this obviously profitable company. The 
company has continued to adhere to its policy of not paying divi­
dends and, while the other shareholders have received substan­
tial sums as salary, benefits and perquisites, Robert has received 
not a penny.  Not surprisingly, he has also been excluded from all 
managerial decisions (there have been no formal shareholders’ 
meetings) and has received the barest minimum of information 
concerning company affairs.127 
At one point in his opinion, the judge seems almost ready to 
take an “all or nothing” view of Robert’s lot: 
[I]t must be recognized that “reasonable expectations” do not 
run only one way.  To the extent that Robert may have enter­
tained “reasonable expectations” of profit in 1975, the other 
shareholders also entertained “reasonable expectations” of fidel­
ity and honesty from him.  All such expectations were shattered 
when Robert stole from the corporation. His own acts broke all 
bargains.  Since then, the only expectations he could reasonably 
entertain were those of a discovered thief: ostracism and prosecu­
tion. To the extent that the majority has refrained from prosecut­
ing him, they have dealt with him more kindly than he had 
reason to expect, not less.128 
In the very next paragraph, however, the judge puts a limit to 
the permissible ostracism: “[e]ven though Robert may not lay claim 
to the reasonable expectation of any specific benefits, it does not 
necessarily follow that the majority shareholders may treat him as 
shabbily as they please.”129  Shifting from “reasonable expecta­
tions” to the question of “whether [the majority’s] conduct was in­
herently oppressive,” the court holds that “[a]lthough a minority 
shareholder may be in the position of a stranger to them, the major­
ity must still act with ‘probity and fair dealing,’ and if their conduct 
126. Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
127. Id. (footnote omitted). 
128. Id. at 1019-20 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
129. Id. at 1020. 
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becomes ‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful,’ they may be found to 
have been guilty of oppression.”130 
Invoking a most venerable authority, the court then gets down 
to the nitty-gritty: 
Robert cannot be forever compelled to remain an outcast.  Even 
Cain was granted protection from the perpetual vengefulness of 
his fellow man.  (Genesis 4:12-15.)  While his past misdeeds pro­
vided sufficient justification for the majority’s acts to date, there 
is a limit to what he can be forced to bear, and that limit has been 
reached.  The other shareholders need not allow him to return to 
employment with the corporation, but they must by some means 
allow him to share in the profits.131 
In sum, although the court details a lengthy list of possible 
remedies, the bottom line is simple: “the majority must make an 
election: they must either alter the corporate financial structure so 
as to commence payment of dividends, or else make a reasonable 
offer to buy out Robert’s interest.”132 
Given the profitability of the corporation involved in Gimpel, 
the court’s order might well have been proper—despite “a no-divi­
dend policy” that already “was firmly established when the present 
majority came into control of the corporation.”133 Gimpel falls 
short of Wilkes, however, on the question of burden shifting. 
Gimpel obliges the majority to fashion a concession to the thief. 
The genius of Wilkes, in contrast, is to place on the miscreant the 
burden of fashioning a practical, non-simplistic solution to the 
problems created by the mischief. 
CONCLUSION 
Wilkes is alive and well in Massachusetts,134 and has influenced 
the law in several other states as well. For example, Montana spe­
cifically adopted Wilkes in 1990: 
130. Id. (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 393 
(Or. 1973)). 
131. Id. at 1021. 
132. Id. at 1022. 
133. Id. at 1020. 
134. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816-17 (Mass. 2009) (applying Wilkes 
and upholding the trial court’s determination “that Pointer’s actions did not require his 
termination because less harmful alternatives outweighed ‘any of the asserted business 
purposes for the actions that Castellani and Woodberry [the controlling shareholders] 
took in secretly engaging Maurer [Pointer’s replacement]’” (quoting trial court)). 
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We determine that the reasoning of the Massachusetts court 
is persuasive and also hold that the fiduciary duty between stock­
holders of a close corporation is one of the “utmost good faith 
and loyalty.”  However, the controlling group should not be 
stymied by a minority stockholder’s grievances if the controlling 
group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose and the mi­
nority stockholder cannot demonstrate a less harmful 
alternative.135 
In 2000, the Minnesota Court of Appeals discussed Wilkes in 
approving tones, but the discussion was dicta.136  The court deter­
mined as a matter of law that the defendants had not infringed any 
protected interest of the plaintiff.137  The next year, however, an­
other Minnesota court explained that “[e]xpectations of continuing 
employment must also be balanced against the controlling share­
holder’s need for flexibility to run the business in a productive man­
ner,” citing Wilkes’s “concern [in] the ‘untempered application of 
the strict good-faith standard.’”138 
A 2001 New Mexico decision seemed likewise to embrace 
Wilkes. Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C. praised Wilkes as having 
a “common sense approach [that] alleviated the court’s concern 
that ‘untempered application of the strict good faith standard’ could 
unduly hamper corporate management. This approach provides 
equilibrium to the majority’s need to pursue legitimate business ac­
tions and the minority’s vulnerability to oppression in a close corpo­
ration.”139 Walta, however, did not apply Wilkes’ multistep 
135. Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 366 (Mont. 1990). 
136. Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
137. Id. at 375 (“As a matter of law West did not breach a fiduciary duty, unfairly 
prejudice Berreman within the meaning of [the statute], or commit fraud.”); see also 
Harris v. Mardan Bus. Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353  (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (invoking 
the legitimate business purpose prong of Wilkes but ignoring steps two and three). 
138. Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 191 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 
657, 663 (1976)).  It is not clear, however, whether Gunderson adopts the Wilkes test. 
The opinion can be read instead as adopting an all-or-nothing rule for miscreants that 
tends to favor the majority.  “[A]n expectation of continuing employment is not reason­
able and oppression liability does not arise when the shareholder-employee’s own mis­
conduct or incompetence causes the termination of employment.” Id. at 192. 
Nonetheless, the decision appears to leave open through remand the possibility of Gun­
derson pursuing damages in his capacity as a shareholder-employee. See id. at 193. 
139. Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) 
(quoting Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663). 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE206.txt unknown Seq: 26 27-SEP-11 9:24 
430 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:405 
analysis, because the defendant could not establish a legitimate bus­
iness purpose for his behavior.140 
Meanwhile, the spirit of Wilkes has pushed Massachusetts law 
even further away from the “miscreant put right.”  In 2006, Brodie 
v. Jordan essentially eliminated the forced buyout as a remedy in 
oppression cases, even when the complainant is blameless.141  Not­
ing that Massachusetts statutes do not provide for dissolution as an 
oppression remedy and therefore do not implicitly authorize the 
lesser remedy of a buyout,142 Brodie holds that “[t]he remedy [for 
oppression] should neither grant the minority a windfall nor exces­
sively penalize the majority.  Rather, it should attempt to reset the 
proper balance between the majority’s ‘concede[d] . . . rights to 
what has been termed selfish ownership,’ and the minority’s reason­
able expectations of benefit from its shares.”143 
Brodie rejects the buyout remedy because that remedy in­
volves a put right that is at odds with the very nature of a close 
corporation: 
In ordering the defendants to purchase the plaintiff’s stock 
at the price of her share of the company, the judge created an 
artificial market for the plaintiff’s minority share of a close cor­
poration—an asset that, by definition, has little or no market 
140. Id. at 460.  Several states have also cited Wilkes to help support the notion 
that the majority has legitimate rights of selfish ownership.  G&N Aircraft, Inc. v. 
Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 240 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Wilkes to show that “there must be a 
balance struck between the majority’s fiduciary obligations and its rights,” but holding 
that majority shareholder’s actions in strong-arming out minority shareholder went be­
yond his rights and caused a breach of fiduciary duty); Connolly v. Bain, 484 N.W.2d 
207, 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (citing Wilkes to show that majority shareholders have 
the right to make management decisions, including the selection, retention, and dismis­
sal of officers and employees); Kortum v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 432, 446 (N.D. 2008) 
(quoting Wilkes when determining that minority shareholder’s expectation of continued 
employment must be balanced against majority’s “need for flexibility to run the busi­
ness in a productive manner”); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977) 
(citing Wilkes for the proposition that the majority owners have a right to make busi­
ness decisions which favor their own interests as long as the decisions are not made in 
bad faith when the majority refused to declare additional dividends demanded by mi­
nority owner who voluntarily left his position); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 649 
(Tenn. 1997) (quoting Wilkes to show “that the controlling group in a close corporation 
must have some room to maneuver” after majority forced out minority owner who they 
felt had not been serving customers appropriately);  McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 
146, 157 (Utah 2009) (quoting Wilkes for “the importance of balancing a shareholders’ 
expectations with the reasonable and legitimate business interests of the other 
shareholders”). 
141. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006). 
142. Id. at 1082 n.7. 
143. Id. at 1080 (internal citation omitted). 
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value.  Thus, the remedy had the perverse effect of placing the 
plaintiff in a position superior to that which she would have en­
joyed had there been no wrongdoing. 
The remedy of a forced buyout may be an appealing one for 
a court of equity in that it results in a “clean break” between 
acrimonious parties.  Yet this rationale would require a forced 
share purchase in virtually every freeze-out case, given that re­
sort to litigation is itself an indication of the inability of share­
holders to work together.  In any event, no matter how expedient 
a forced buyout may be as a solution, the remedy for a breach of 
fiduciary duty must be proportional to the breach.  Other reme­
dies are available to compensate and protect minority sharehold­
ers without radically transforming the nature of their asset or 
arbitrarily increasing its value.144 
Whether Brodie goes too far in restricting oppression remedies 
is a question for another Symposium, or at least another article. 
For the purposes of this symposium, it should now be clear that 
Wilkes has a commendable legacy.  By recognizing the legitimate 
rights of selfish ownership and disfavoring all-or-nothing ap­
proaches to oppression analysis, Wilkes has made significant con­
ceptual and practical contributions to the law of closely held 
businesses. 
144. Id. at 1081-82 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). 
